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THE STATE, THE DEATH PENALTY,
AND CARL JOHNSONt
DAVID R. Dow*
lEiverything begins in sentiment and assumption and finds its
issue in political action and institutions. The converse is also true:
just as sentiments become ideas, ideas eventually establish them-
selves as sentiments.
—Lionel Trilling'
Eight minutes after the State of Texas began to inject poison into
his veins, Carl Johnson died. Like most every inmate executed by the
State, Johnson coughed twice before he ceased all other movement.
Unlike most other execution victims, Johnson's eyes never closed, but
stared up lifelessly as the doctor checked his vital signs before declaring
him dead at 12:24 a.m. Johnson thus became the ninety-ninth person
executed by the State since Texas resumed the infliction of death in
1982. A hundred years from now, Harold Joe Lane will be the answer
to a trivia question, for Lane was the State's one hundredth execution
victim. Carl Johnson died a month too early; a hundred years from
now Johnson will be what he already is: a historical footnote.
Johnson was my client. I began representing him in October 1988.
1 had previously declined several other requests to represent con-
demned inmates, but when I went to Texas's death row at the invitation
of another lawyer to meet several inmates, Johnson was among those
whom I met. My host told me that Johnson had an execution date
scheduled for two weeks hence and that his lawyer had quit the day
before. At the time, no petition for writ of habeas corpus had been
filed. I thought it would be wrong for the State to execute a man who
had no one representing him, so I agreed to handle the case. This
t Copyright CI 1996, David R. Dow.
* Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I thank Steve Bright, Mark Dow, Irene
Rosenberg and Paul Schwartz for extremely valuable advice, and I thank the University of
Houston Law Foundation for financial support. I thank the Texas Resource Center, and especially
Eden Harrington, for years of support.
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essay describes my nearly seven-year experience of handling Johnson's
appeal.
In the last few years, the public, which has supported the death
penalty by significant margins for a generation, has become increas-
ingly hostile to legal claims raised by convicted murderers. 2
 This politi-
cal sensibility has, regrettably, permeated the judicial sphere as well.
Not only politicians but judges have grown weary of the law. Writing
in the New York Times, for example, Judge Kozinski of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed the view that lawyers
handling death penalty appeals get rich and that far too many appeals
get filed' Judge Jones of the Fifth Circuit has likewise expressed the
view that appeals linger too long. 4 Even Supreme Court Justices, nota-
bly Justices Scalia and Thomas, have expressed exasperation at the
appellate process.' They, like Judge Jones, have literally accused lawyers
of abusing the system by prolonging appeals.'
I did not receive a penny for representing Johnson (nor have I
been compensated for any of the work I have clone on the two dozen
other death penalty appeals with which I have assisted). I frankly do
not know a single lawyer who has gotten rich representing murderers.
Nevertheless, I do think it is fair to say that the universe of death
penalty lawyers is like the universe of all other specialists: it includes
some practitioners who are unethical. So does the universe of tax
lawyers, of law professors, of prosecutors and even the universe of
federal judges. Ridding any profession of its unethical practitioners is
a desirable goal. The problem, however, is that death penalty lawyers
have been accused of being unethical simply because they are death
penalty lawyers. My experience from having served as a volunteer
lawyer in this domain for seven years is that the vast majority of spe-
cialists in this very specialized universe care deeply about the law and
the integrity of our legal system. To be sure, and not the least bit
2 See William J. Bowers et al., A New Look at Public. Opinion on Capital Punishment, 22 Am. J.
CRIM. L. 77 (1994).
3 See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, For an Honest Death Penalty, N.Y. Timis, Mar. 8, 1995,
at A21.
4 Edith Jones, Death Penalty Procedures: A Proposal for Reform, 53 '17:x. Bj. 850, 851 (1990).
5 See, e.g., Collins v. Byrd, 114 S. Ct. 1288 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6 In one vitriolic opinion, judge Jones chastised a lawyer for "playing chicken" with the court
by waiting until the eleventh hour to file the inmate's habeas petition. Bell V. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d
978, 986 (5th Cir. 1988) (Jones4, concurring), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989). Ironically, the
lawyer's client, Walter Bell, subsequently obtained relief and a new trial, though he has since been
sentenced to death once again.
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surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of lawyers who handle death
penalty appeals for a living are opposed to capital punishment (if not
when they begin their careers, then certainly by the end of them). Yet
they are therefore excoriated, in literally demonic rhetoric," for taking
advantage of a legal mechanism—habeas corpus appeal—to pursue a
political goal: namely, abolition of the death penalty. In fact, that
canard is unsupported by even the thinnest shred of evidence. What
death penalty lawyers actually do is what lawyers are supposed to do:
they represent their clients.
Those who criticize death penalty lawyers for abusing the legal
process fall into two categories: those who know better, and those who
do not. My aim in this essay is to speak to the latter group. I do so by
describing the process of Carl Johnson's death penalty appeals and my
representation of him. In certain respects, Johnson's case is unusual,
yet in most regards it is fairly ordinary. That is one reason I have chosen
to write about it rather than some other more exotic case. In addition,
of the various cases I have worked on, Johnson's is the only one with
which I have been involved from the first state habeas petition through
the carrying out of the execution. My discussion is, at times, unavoid-
ably doctrinal, but my larger aim is simply to show, through the case
of Carl Johnson, how America goes about putting convicted murderers
to death.
I'm not the sort of lawyer who takes a lot of notes.
—Joe Cannon, who represented Carl Johnson at trials
At around the same time that. I met Carl Johnson, I began teaching
a seminar on substantive death penalty law. This seminar grew out of
my federal jurisdiction course. Over the past decade, some of the most
important cases in the area of habeas corpus have tended to be death
penalty appeals,° and so through an interest in habeas corpus, I backed
into an interest in substantive death penalty law. I mention this bit of
autobiography to emphasize a salient point: I am not an abolitionist,
and I did not start doing death penalty appeals out of some unequivo-
cal opposition to capital punishment. Indeed, the first time I was asked
7 See Panel Discussion, The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency & Due Process in Death
Penalty Cases, 31 Holm. L. REv. 1105, 1114-18 (1994).
8 Paul Barren, On the Defense,  WALL ST. J., Sept.. 7, 1994, at. A6.
"See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993);
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Coleman v.
Thompson, 5111 U.S. 722 (1991); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Murray v. Giarratano,
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to handle a death penalty appeal I answered by saying that I was
uninterested because I supported the death penalty. The lawyer who
had approached me emphasized that I should take the case anyway
because the only people who get executed are those who are poor. The
solution to that problem, I said at the time, would be to execute more
rich people.
The transcript of the Johnson case opened my eyes to a phenome-
non to which I suspect the O.J. Simpson trial has opened millions
more: America has two justice systems, one for wealthy defendants,
another for the poor. Wealth matters because, in many cases, trial
outcomes depend less on what really happened than on an advocate's
skill. It is a chilling irony that the public's sudden attention to this
obvious fact has been caused not by publicity surrounding the cases of
those defendants who have been wrongfully convicted but, instead, by
cases where the public perceives that a defendant has been wrongfully
acquitted.'" Of course, the former phenomenon is far more injurious
to our justice system and, in truth, far more common.
Data unmistakably indicates how crucial the lawyer's role is. In the
area of death penalty prosecutions, lawyer skill is the single most
important factor in determining whether a defendant is sentenced to
death rather than life.'' The significance of lawyer skill is equally
apparent in the criminal context generally. 12 For example, in recent
years, in Texas, criminal defendants who can afford to retain private
counsel are acquitted 14.4% of the time, whereas indigent defendants
who rely on court-appointed lawyers are acquitted only 5.4% of the
time. Similarly, only 8.3% of defendants who retain counsel receive
prison time, as compared to 25.4% of defendants who require ap-
pointed lawyers.' 3
In Carl Johnson's case, the ineptitude of the lawyer who repre-
sented him jumps off the printed page. During long periods of jury
voir dire, while the State was asking questions of individual jurors, the
transcripts give one the impression that Johnson's lawyer was not even
present in the courtroom. Upon investigation, it turned out that he
492 U.S. I (1989). Perhaps the most important habeas case of the last decade, however, was a
lion- death penalty case, Teague v, lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the essential holding of which was
quickly applied to death penalty appeals in Peury v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989).
lu Both the Simpson trial and the trial of the Menendez brothers in California have contrib-
uted to the public interest. See Letter from David R. Dow, Trial by jury, COMMENTARY, July 1994,
at 6-7 (responding to Walter Berns, Getting Away with Murder; Comm:L.17'Am% Apr. 1994, at 25).
"David R. Dow. Teague and Death: The. Impart of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital
Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 23, 26-27 (1991).
12 See Mark Ballard, Gideon's Broken Promise, TEx. LAw., Aug. 28, 1995, at I.
13 id.
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was in fact present; it's just that he was asleep. That is not to say that
an awake lawyer would necessarily have done a better job or obtained
a different result. It is just to say that Johnson's lawyer was asleep. 14
Johnson did have a second lawyer, a tyro less than a year out of
law school who had never previously tried a capital case. He did not
fall asleep. His burden was not incompetence but inexperience.
The mere fact that Johnson's chief lawyer slept during portions of
Johnson's trial is not necessarily of any legal moment. An indigent
capital defendant has a constitutional right to counsel. That right has
been generously construed to mean a right to effective counsel, but
the test used to determine effectiveness is not especially rigorous. A
defendant who challenges the competency of his lawyer must prove
that the lawyer's performance fell below a certain standard and that
but for the lawyer's error(s), there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different.° The standard is
onerous and is rarely satisfied. Lawyers who show up at trial drunk,
who have sexual affairs with the spouse of the defendant they repre-
sent, who go through entire trials without raising even a single objec-
tion, who file one-page appellate briefs from city drunk tanks have all
been deemed constitutionally competent.' 6
And I was	 high until the fatal day
a lawyer proved I wasn't born'd I was only hatched.
I'll never get out of this world alive.
—Hank Williams"
14 1 should add that no one disputes that the lawyer in fact dozed off on several occasions.
When Johnson first told me that his lawyer had fallen asleep, I took his comment with the usual
large grain of salt with which I take many reports from inmates. But all it took was a phone call
to the co-counsel to confirm that the story was indeed true. In a later case, a trial court deemed
this lawyer constitutionally ineffective, but the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected that court's
conclusion. See Ex parte Bnrdine, 901 S.W.2d 455, 457-58 (Tex. Ct. App.) (Maloney,]., dissenting)
(judge Baird and judge Overstreet joined in the opinion), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2256 (1995).
15 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 691-92 (1984),
For a truly harrowing discussion of endemic ineptitude in representation of indigent
capital defendants, see Stephen B, Bright, Counsellor the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE 1,,j, 1835 (1994). In the last six years I have worked on
perhaps twenty different deaths penalty appeals. All but three of the clients have been executed.
Of the three, I continue to work on only one of the cases; it is a case from West Texas involving
torture to coerce a confession. That client, who is best served by remaining nameless at this point,
will probably one day walk out of prison. Though I have seen the work of what are surely some
of the worst lawyers in America, I have never been involved in a case where any court at any level
ruled that the defendant's lawyer was constitutionally ineffective.
17 HANK WILLIAMS, I'll Never Get Out of this World Alive, on nil,: ORIGINAL. SINGLES COLLEC-
Tiorr (PolyGratti Records 1990).
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Johnson was tried in 1979. He had left the army, returned to
Houston with a heroin habit, and moved back into the bleak inner city
neighborhood where he grew up. On a day in October of 1978, a friend
of his named Carl Baltimore proposed that he and Johnson rob a small
grocery store, the Wayne's Food Market, to get cash to buy drugs.
Johnson agreed to the plan but said he had no weapon. Baltimore
provided him with one, a .38 revolver. They entered the Wayne's Food
Market together. Baltimore held a gun to the owner's head—then the
details get murky. Johnson said that an elderly security guard named
Ed Thompson started firing and that he fired back in self-defense. No
one contradicted his version of events, but only Johnson himself knew
whether it was really true. Thompson, who was nearly seventy-five years
old at the time, was shot in the head and killed. Johnson and Baltimore
were arrested several days later.
At the time that he was arrested and charged with capital murder,
Johnson had been arrested once before. He was arrested and convicted
for unlawful possession of a weapon (an offense for which half the
population of Houston could be arrested at any given moment). When
he was arrested for the robbery-murder at the Wayne's Food Market,
Johnson made the crucial mistake of proclaiming his innocence. That
gave Baltimore an opportunity to roll over first, which he did. He
pleaded guilty in exchange for a forty-year sentence, of which he
served eight before being paroled.
Johnson, who was indigent, had two lawyers appointed to repre-
sent him. One had been out of law school for not even a year. He had
never tried a capital case. The other had tried many capital cases. Every
single one of his clients had ended up on death row. Indeed, at one
point in the early 1990s, around 1 in 5 members of death row whose
cases had come out of Harris County had been represented by a single
lawyer: the one Johnson got.I 8
The lawyer did as bad a job as one can imagine. In addition to
sleeping during jury selection and portions of the testimony itself, he
neglected to interview witnesses prior to putting them on the stand,
which led to the entertaining spectacle of his not knowing in advance
what his own witnesses planned to say. Although Johnson had given a
confession, Johnson's lawyer put on a defense urging that Johnson was
innocent. Johnson was quickly convicted.
18
 The lawyer is described in Barrett, supra note 8. The lawyer, since representing Johnson,
has seers two of his clients escape death row, though it is not clear whether this was because of
his actions or the State's decision.
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Capital murder trials in Texas proceed in two stages. At the first
stage the jury determines whether the defendant committed the act
which the State accuses him of having committed. At the second the
jury assesses punishment. It does so by answering "special issues." At
the time of Johnson's trial, the first special issue inquired into whether
the defendant's actions had been deliberate; the second inquired into
whether the defendant would probably commit violent acts in the
future. (A third question was not asked of the jury because Johnson's
lawyer did not request that the judge issue it; if the third question
had been asked, the jury would have been called upon to determine
whether Johnson's decision to fire his weapon was a reasonable re-
sponse to provocation.) Affirmative answers to the two special issues
result in automatic imposition of a death sentence."
At the punishment phase of the trial Johnson's lawyer called three
witnesses. One, Johnson's father, testified that he had abandoned Carl
at an early age. A second, Johnson's former common-law wife, testified
that he was basically nonviolent. Only the third witness was unrelated
to Johnson; he was Reverend Shelvy Brown, the minister of a neigh-
borhood Baptist church, who knew Johnson and his family. He had
approached Johnson's lawyer about testifying in Johnson's behalf, and
Johnson's lawyer had the good sense not to turn him away. The essence
of what Reverend Brown had to say was that Johnson's character was
essentially good, that his recent attraction to violence was aberrational
rather than deeply rooted, and that he could list a variety of good deeds
Johnson had clone in the community and for his family.
For technical reasons which were probably ill-founded legally, 2°
the State objected to Brown's testimony. Johnson's lawyer, for unknown
reasons, did not fight the State's objection. The trial judge instructed
the jury to disregard the Reverend's testimony.
During its deliberations, the jury sent the trial judge a note. It said:
"Can we consider rehabilitation in determining the answer to the
second charge [i.e., the one concerning whether Johnson would be
19 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the
Texas statute was changed. The jury still determines whether the defendant acted deliberately
and whether he will he dangerous, but if the jury answers affirmatively, then it must determine
whether, based on all the mitigating evidence, the defendant should be sentenced to death or
life in prison. See TEx. Glum. Paoc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 §§ 2(b), 2(e) (West 1994). Johnson's
jury did not answer this third question.
29 The ruling probably was ill-founded legally, among other reasons, because even if state
evidentiary rules supported the exclusion, which Johnson argued was not the case, the Constitu-
tion clearly requires that such testimony be admissible in a capital case. See, e.g., &Wings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
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dangerous in the future] ?"21
 The trial judge should have said, "Yes,
of course you can." Had the judge made clear to the jury that it
could take Johnson's rehabilitative potential into account, the jury
might have figured out that Johnson's prospects for rehabilitation
could support a negative answer to the question concerning his future
dangerousness, which would have translated into a life sentence rather
than lethal injection. But instead the trial judge said, neutrally, "I can
only refer you to the evidence you have heard and the charge of the
court."22
 Johnson's lawyer, for unknown reasons, did not complain at
the time about that answer.
The United States Supreme Court's view has long been that reha-
bilitation is patently relevant to the determination of who should
receive the death penalty,23
 and the Court has viewed the Texas ques-
tion concerning future dangerousness as allowing for consideration of
rehabilitation potential. 24
 The problem, of course, is that the leeway
which special issue number two affords to jurors with respect to taking
a defendant's rehabilitation potential into account is not always evident
to the jurors themselves, as was clearly the case with Johnson's jury.
Simply put, a jury that knows it can take rehabilitation potential into
account does not ask a trial judge whether it may do so.
The jury answered both special issues affirmatively, so Johnson
automatically received the death penalty. A new lawyer was appointed
to file a direct appeal. The appellate brief was around twenty pages
long, which is rather short. It raised fewer than ten issues, even though
at least twice that number were available. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, the highest court for criminal matters in the State, voted to
affirm Johnson's conviction. 25
 In spite of the thinness of the appel-
late brief, two judges on that court nevertheless were persuaded that
Johnson's conviction was problematic, and they voted to grant him a
new tria1. 26
Johnson's appellate lawyer did not ask the United States Supreme
Court to review the case, so Johnson's case became final on May 10,
1981.27
 The trial court set Johnson's execution for July 28, 1982.
21 See Johnson's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Exhibit 17, December 23, 1993, filed in
the United States District. Court for the Southern District of Texas.
22 Id.
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275-76 (1976).
24 Id. at 273; see also Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 178 (1988).
"Johnson v. State, 629 S.W.2d 731, 737-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (Clinton, j., dissenting).
Johnson's motion for a rehearing was denied on February 10, 1982. Id. at 731.
26 Id.
27
 Rehearing was denied in Johnson's direct appeal on February 10, 1982. The conviction
became final 90 days later.
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Once a criminal conviction is final, the legal device available to
attack it, or the sentence, is the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28
Under federal law, a habeas petitioner cannot proceed directly to
federal court but must first give state courts an opportunity to correct
any legal errors. This aspect of habeas corpus procedure is called the
exhaustion requirement, referring to the need to exhaust state avenues
for relief before pursuing a federal remedy. 29 It is not an arcane ele-
ment of habeas corpus law. Quite the contrary is true; it is a principle
that is deeply rooted and firmly established in modern law.
Nevertheless, the same lawyer who filed Johnson's direct appeal
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court in July
1982, even though he had not first proceeded through the state courts.
The federal court granted a stay of execution and then, nearly a year
later, in May 1983, realized that Johnson had not exhausted his state
court remedies. At that point the federal court dismissed the habeas
petition without prejudice (meaning that the dismissal was not a com-
ment on the merits of the petition's substantive arguments). For rea-
sons not known, however, neither Johnson nor the lawyer who filed
the federal habeas petition was notified of the dismissal until 1987.
During the intervening four years, the State took no action. It took no
steps to notify Johnson that his execution would be set unless he
pursued his appeal. Finally, the State set Johnson's execution for Oc-
tober 10, 1988, In late September his lawyer resigned. I went to the
prison on October I, met Johnson, and was asked that afternoon
whether I would represent him. On October 7, 1 asked the state court
for an emergency stay so I could study the file and file a habeas petition
in state courts. The stay motion was granted.
The following summer, the summer of 1989, was a volatile period
in Texas death penalty law. In July, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided Penry v. Lynaugh, which involved a challenge to the
Texas statute by a retarded death row inmate who asserted that the
28 See generally 28 U.S.C. it) 2259 (1984).
'-'9 The exhaustion requirement is now codified as part of the procedural rules pertaining to
habeas corpus procedures in the federal courts. See id. § 2259 (b). The requirement first appeared
in case law as early as 1886. See Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 291, 252 (1886). The doctrine is now
firmly established. See, e.g„ Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 515 (1982). The scholarship pertaining to exhaustion is legion. See generally 1 JAMES
LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 37-56 (1988); Paul M. Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Hmtv. L. REv. 441
(1963); Gary feller, In Defense of Federal Habeas COYPUS Relitigation, 16 Hmtv. C.R.•C.L. L. REV.
579 (1982).
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Texas death penalty law did not give the sentencing jury the opportu-
nity to give mitigating effect to evidence of child abuse and mental
retardation, as the Constitution requires." The Supreme Court agreed
with Penry, but what was not immediately clear was how far reaching
the impact of the Penry decision would be. The language of the opin-
ion itself appeared broad indeed, and lawyers representing death row
inmates in Texas almost uniformly concluded that their cases were
helped by Penry. Moreover, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals sub-
sequently determined that an inmate could raise a claim under Penry
even if it had not been preserved procedurally under state law. 3 '
Johnson's case remained in the state courts for nearly six years, as
the law pertaining to so-called Penry claims percolated. During those
six years, several decisions amplifying the Penry holding were handed
down, by both the United States Supreme Court as well as the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. As the rule of Penry was increasingly refined
(some would say eviscerated), Johnson filed briefs in the state court
emphasizing the significance of these developments to his own case.
While Johnson's case was simmering in state court, the federal
landscape was changing dramatically. In addition to the ineluctable
narrowing of the Penry holding, the Fifth Circuit, the federal circuit
with jurisdiction over Johnson's case, was becoming exasperated with
death penalty appeals. Throughout the 1980s, a death row inmate
pursuing federal habeas corpus appeals could count on having an
opportunity at some point to introduce evidence that his trial lawyer
had been ineffective. However, in the 1989 case of McCoy v. Lynaugh,32
a capital defendant who had never received an evidentiary hearing as
part of his first federal habeas petition was speedily executed during
his first trip through the courts. That procedure had not previously
occurred. The McCoy case signalled that death row inmates would
no longer be assured an opportunity at which they could present live
evidence establishing that their representation had been ineffec-
tive or that any other constitutional errors vitiated their conviction or
sentence.
Similarly, throughout the 1980s, the Fifth Circuit granted a death
row petitioner the opportunity to have oral argument before that court
whenever it determined that the petitioner was raising an argument
30 492 U.S. 302 (1989). The notion that the Constitution requires the sentencer in assessing
the sentence to take into account all mitigating evidence proffered by the capital defendant was
delineated in Lockett s Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
31
 Selvage v. Collins, 816 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. Grim. App. 1991).
32 874 F.2d 954, 956 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Upon which reasonable legal minds could disagree. In the case of death
row inmate Johnny James, however, the Fifth Circuit, for the first time
in its history, issued a certificate of probable cause to appeal—meaning
that James' case presented arguable issues—but nonetheless then dis-
posed of the case on the summary calendar without providing James
an opportunity for oral argument." In short, the Filth Circuit had
grown tired of death penalty cases.
Finally, in June of 1993, the state trial court denied Johnson relief
and set his execution for January 4, 1994. Six months later, on Decem-
ber 15, 1993, the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the trial court's
determination in an unpublished order. The case was finally ripe for
federal court review. The order of subsequent events was as follows:
1.Johnson filed a federal habeas petition (his first, excluding the
petition from 1982 which should never have been filed in federal court
in the first place) on December 23, 1993, barely one week after the
Court of Criminal Appeals denied him relief and a week and a half
before his scheduled execution.
2. On January 3, a day before the execution, the federal district
court granted a stay.
3. Over nine months later, in September 1994, the district court
ruled against Johnson. Johnson appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
4. In March, the Fifth Circuit set a briefing schedule and ordered
that Johnson's brief be filed in May 1995.
5. Following the issuance of the Fifth Circuit's briefing schedule,
the State ordered that Johnson be executed on September 19, 1995.
6. In May, Johnson filed his brief in the Fifth Circuit, as ordered.
In July, after receiving an extension, the State filed its answer.
7. On September 11, the Fifth Circuit had still not decided the
case, so Johnson filed a stay motion. (The execution was scheduled for
September 19.)
8. The next day, on September 12, less than one week before his
scheduled execution, the Fifth Circuit ruled against Johnson.
9. Also on September 12, the clerk of the United States Supreme
Court called to ask whether I would be filing any appeals with that
Court. I said I would file a petition seeking a writ of certiorari along
with a stay application on Sunday the 17th.
10. At 6:00 p.m. on Sunday the 17th, a three issue petition for writ
of certiorari was sent by facsimile to the Court. Johnson's execution
was scheduled to occur in eighteen hours.
33
 James v. Collins, 987 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 509 U.S. 947 (1993). I should add
that I was James' cocounsel.
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There had been some confusion as to when exactly Johnson's
execution would transpire because the Texas legislature had recently
amended the law pertaining to the time of carrying out executions. 34
Under the old statute, executions occurred between midnight and
dawn. In one famous case, the appeal to the Supreme Court literally
took all night, and by the time the Court ruled against the habeas
petitioner the sun was rising in central Texas, and so the inmate, who
had been strapped to the gurney since midnight, was taken back to his
cell, to be executed six months later. 35 In Johnson's case, prison officials
originally said that. he would be executed under the new law, which
provides that executions occur after 6 PM on the date of the execution
(therefore meaning that they occur between 6 and midnight). That
would have meant that Johnson would be injected after 6 PM on
Tuesday the 19th. But on Wednesday, September 13, when the clerk
of the Supreme Court called me to ask me when and if I planned to
file a stay application in the Supreme Court, she informed me that
prison officials had determined that Johnson would be executed under
the old statute, meaning eighteen hours earlier. In the meantime,
guards on death row had told Johnson that he was going to be exe-
cuted at 6 PM on Monday the 18th. Nobody was exactly sure when
Johnson would die.
The stay application and certiorari petition which were filed with
the Court on Sunday the 17th lacked an in forma pauperis ("IFP")
affidavit. Federal courts waive the filing fees for indigent litigants, but
receiving a waiver requires one to file an 1FP affidavit attesting to
one's indigence. 36 To file the affidavit, I needed to get Carl's notarized
signature.
The day of the scheduled execution was a beautiful Texas summer
day. Huntsville, where the death row prison is located, lies about
seventy miles north-northwest of Houston. The city is nestled next to
the East Fork of the Trinity River, in a fertile area just to the east of
the mouth of the San Jacinto River. Sam Houston camped nearby
on his way south to fight in Texas's war of independence, and the
drive up from Houston takes one by the Sam Houston National Forest.
34 See TEX. CODE. CR3M. PROC. art. 43.14 (West 1995).
35 As it became clear that the Supreme Court would not rule before sunrise, a Judge on the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Sam Houston Clinton, issued a stay. Herrera was eventually
executed after the Supreme Court reached the merits of his case in Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct.
853 (1993); but he had come within moments of death a year earlier, when the Court had denied
him temporary relief. See Heri .era v. Texas, 502 U.S. 1085 (1992).
36 Sup. Ct. R. 39.
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Every time I drive to the prison I am awed by the land's sheer physical
beauty.
I drove into Huntsville at around I PM, stopped by the motel at
which I was registered to see if any messages had arrived, then drove
out to the prison. I parked my truck in a parking lot full of other
pickups. My shotgun resting in the gun rack visible through the truck's
rear window announced that my vehicle belonged there. I approached
the guard tower and told the guard my name and who I was there to
see. Then I waited. I looked at my watch, and then at the guard, and
then again at my watch. After I had stood outside the razor-wire topped
fence for eight minutes and forty-five seconds under the scorching
Texas sun, the prison guard took a break from her crossword puzzle
to unlock the gate and let me into the prison.
There are no contact visits for death row inmates in Texas. A wall,
with thick, wire-laced bullet proof glass, separates the inmates from
their visitors. When I arrived at the visiting area, Carl's wife Barbara
was with him. I was accompanied by another lawyer who was also
working with me on Carl's case. The four of us made small talk and
discussed details, such as Carl's wishes concerning the disposal of his
remains. In short, I forgot about the IFP affidavit.
Finally at three o'clock, while I was talking to Carl and his wife, a
guard came up to me and passed along a message that had been left
by the clerk at the Supreme Court asking where the IFP affidavit was.
I asked prison officials to send a notary to witness Carl's signature.
Forty-six minutes later, a notary arrived. Regulations require death row
inmates to have their hands shackled behind them when removed from
the cages they sit in during visits, but Carl needed to sign an affidavit.
The prison guard, exercising her discretion, ignored the regulation
and agreed to permit Carl's hands to be cuffed in front. He signed the
affidavit and a guard slid it to me through a slot in the wall. I drove
back into town to fax it to the Supreme Court. But coming over the
fax machine when I arrived at my hotel was the State of Texas's
response to the papers I had filed in the Supreme Court the previous
day. The hotel could not send my fax until it had finished receiving
the other one from the State, and when I arrived at the hotel page two
of a thirty page document was being received. I called the clerk at the
Court and explained my dilemma and promised that the IFP affidavit
would arrive momentarily. Finally, I called the person who was sending
me the State's response and asked that the transmission be halted. We
were thus able to fax the IFP affidavit to the Supreme Court at five
o'clock. I called the clerk to make sure it had arrived, and she told me
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that it had and that the Court had denied Carl's appeal by a vote of
7-2, with Justices Stevens and Ginsburg voting to grant the stay. Four
votes are required to grant certiorari, but five are needed for a stay.
We had not come close.
Johnson's petition before the Supreme Court raised three issues.
One dealt with whether the jury should have been answered forth-
rightly when it inquired about the possibility of rehabilitation." A
second dealt with whether it was a reversible mistake for the trial court
to have excluded the testimony of Reverend Brown. 38 The third dealt
with a timing issue, which I will explain a bit more momentarily.
In responsive papers filed by the State of Texas in the Supreme
Court responding to Johnson's claim that the jury should have been
told that it could consider Johnson's prospects for rehabilitation, the
State argued that Johnson's lawyer did not object to the trial judge's
answer to the jury's note at time of trial. (It is not clear from the
transcript whether Johnson's lawyer was napping when the jury's note
was received; however, the transcript does not record that his lawyer
said anything at all at this critical moment.) Likewise, in reslionse to
Johnson's claim that the trial court's exclusion of Reverend Brown's
testimony was reversible error, the State again argued that Johnson's
lawyer did not object to the exclusion at trial.
The timing issue raised by Johnson in the Supreme Court (i.e.,
the third issue in the certiorari petition) concerned the decision by
the State to set an execution date even while the case was pending in
the Fifth Circuit. Although the Fifth Circuit has been notoriously
inhospitable to claims raised by death row inmates over the past half
decade," and might well have decided against Johnson even if that
court had given his claims thoughtful attention, Johnson argued in the
Supreme Court that the Fifth Circuit gave hurried consideration to his
federal claims as a result of the State's decision to set an execution date
while the court was in the midst of analyzing the legal issues.°
37I argued that this issue raised concerns like those present in Simmons v. South Carolina,
114 S. Gt. 2187 (1994), in which the Court held that a capital defendant's due process rights were
abridged when a jury was confused about his eligibility for parole under a life sentence.
3°Technically, I argued that the Court should determine whether a so-called Hitchcock error
can ever be deemed harmless or whether it requires per se reversal. In Hitchcock v. Dugger. the
Court invalidated a Florida death sentence because the sentencer felt precluded by Florida law
from giving mitigating effect to any factors other than those identified in the statute. 481 U.S.
393, 398 (1987).
39 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
40 My argument was that the State had interfered with Johnson's right of access to the federal
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Recall that while Johnson's appeal was pending in the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the State had set his execution date. Indeed, Judges Reavley and
Jones of the Fifth Circuit have both criticized the State of Texas for
using execution dates to drive cases hurriedly through the federal
courts. 41 Texas, as have other states, has long used the setting of dates
as an impetus to motivate lawyers to file their habeas appeals,42 but the
use of an execution date to impel court action is obviously a different
matter, one that raises a distinct set of concerns, which is precisely why
Judges Reavley and Jones have complained about it.
It is impossible to tell whether Johnson would have fared any
better in the Fifth Circuit had it considered his case with greater care,
or even whether the setting of the execution date hurried the court's
analysis. But one thing is clear: the Fifth Circuit's opinion includes at
least one quite inexplicable error—well, perhaps not truly inexplica-
ble, for it readily partakes of an error caused by haste.
In his appeal from the federal district court's ruling, Johnson had
raised the question of the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction. In the portion of
his brief detailing the case's procedural history, Johnson pointed out
that his notice of appeal was not filed until February 21, 1995, even
though the district court had denied him relief on September 22, 1994.
In the following footnote, I questioned the court's jurisdiction:
Petitioner's Notice of' Appeal was timely filed notwithstand-
ing the passage of nearly five months between Judge Har-
mon's order and the posting of the notice of appeal. In fact,
in view of the various filings which followed Judge Harmon's
September 1994 Order, Petitioner has some question as to
whether this Court presently has jurisdiction.
Judge Harmon's September 1994 order granted Respon-
dent's Motion for Summary Judgment and declined to issue
a certificate of probable cause, yet her order also preserved
the stay of execution then in effect contingent on Johnson's
perfecting an appeal to this Court. The State desired to dis-
courts for the purpose of obtaining habeas review. The right of access has its roots in Ex parte
Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), and has been explicated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),
and Bounds v, Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-22 (1977). 1 argued that the right is abridged when a
state interferes with meaningful access by holding a federal court's feet to the fire to expedite its
review,
41 See Mark Ballard, Death Penalty System Ridiculed: Fifth  Circuit Judge Blames Process, Not
Resource Center, for Delays, Tex. Law., May 11, 1992, at 4 (quoting Judge Reavley's description of
the Texas death penalty system as 'Vaudeville"); Jones, supra note 4.
' 12 Under the new Texas post-conviction statute, this use of an execution date as a spur will
not be necessary, as the statute provides time limitations for filing collateral appeals. See Thx.
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solve the stay and therefore filed a Rule 59(e) motion in early
October 1994. The filing of that motion had the effect of
making the summary judgment order not final (and hence
not appealable to this Court). . . . Petitioner filed a response
to the Rule 59(e) motion on October 6, 1994.
On January 13, 1995, with the Rule 59(e) motion still pend-
ing, the State filed an additional motion, requesting that
Judge Harmon expedite her ruling on the Rule 59(e) motion.
Two weeks later, on January 27, 1995, Judge Harmon granted
the State's motion to expedite and vacated the stay of execu-
tion but did not rule on the Rule 59(e) motion itself Neverthe-
less, not wanting to risk defaulting his appeal, Petitioner filed
a Notice of Appeal despite his concern that the district court
has yet to enter a final judgment in this matter.
Accordingly, this Court may well lack subject matter juris-
diction at this time. 43
The first sentence says that, despite appearances to the contrary,
Johnson's notice of appeal was filed on time; the last sentence ques-
tions whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the case.
One might say that this argument was just picayune quibbling.
Perhaps. But whatever else one might say about it, the argument itself
does not seem terribly subtle or arcane. Still the Fifth Circuit appar-
ently misunderstood it, for this is what the court said in its opinion
denying Johnson relief: "Petitioner questions whether the notice of
appeal, filed February 22, 1995, is timely in view of the various filings
following the district court's order of September 22, 1994 granting the
state's motion for summary judgment. . . [T] he notice of appeal is
timely."" Obviously, it would have been most extraordinary for Johnson
to call into question the timeliness of his own notice of appeal, and it
is difficult to figure out how the Fifth Circuit read the footnote in
Johnson's brief to be raising such a question. Yet it did.
In addition, it is fair to say that the Fifth Circuit's opinion essen-
tially parroted the conclusions of the district court without responding
at all in any direct fashion to the arguments Johnson directed against
the lower court's analysis. Most strikingly of all, of course, is the timing:
GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 11.071 §§ 4(a)—(b) (West 1996). The statutory procedure, however,
has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny.
43 See Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal and Brief in Support; and
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4-5 n.2 (citation omitted).
" Johnson v. Scott, No. 95-20117, unpublished Fifth Circuit opinion, filed 12 September
1995. The author maintains a copy of the opinion.
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after having had both sides' briefs for over two months, and after
having had Johnson's brief for nearly four months, the Fifth Circuit
issued a mistake-riddled, unresponsive opinion less than a week before
a scheduled execution. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to
resist the conclusion that the Fifth Circuit was cranking it out at the
last minute in response to the impending date.
In response to Johnson's argument in the petition for certiorari
that the State had used an execution date to hold a federal court's feet
to the Fire, the State responded that Johnson had not made that point
in the court below and was therefore barred from raising it in a
certiorari petition. The State also argued that the Fifth Circuit was not
obligated to pay serious attention to most of Johnson's claims because
they had been deemed procedurally barred. The United States Su-
preme Court, of course, does not provide reasons when it denies a stay
or a petition for certiorari, but its disposition of Johnson's case is
consistent with the view that his claims were defaulted.
When a life is at stake, the fact that one or a few claims may "fall
through the cracks" and reach the merits is a small price to pay for
utter and scrupulous fairness to an accused under sentence of
death.
—Judge Jerre Williams, concurring in McCoy v. Lynaugh"
Carl Johnson committed a horrible act; there is no question about
it. But after he did so, the State's ignominy began. First it provided
Johnson with a somnambulant lawyer, and then both the state and
federal courts decided that the merits of Johnson's constitutional
claims could not be reached because his sleeping lawyer had not
raised them earlier. 46 So if a death penalty advocate were to argue that
15 874 F.2d 954, 968 (5th Cir. 1989) (Williams, J., concurring).
46 In Lockhart a Fretwell, the Court determined that a lawyer's failure to raise certain objec-
tions did not constitute prejudice under Strickland. 113 S. Ct. 838, 841 (1993). Johnson argued
that the appropriate standard for determining prejudice in his case was the test the Court
identified in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), though it must be added that the proper
application of that standard to the Texas statute is unclear. Under Sawyer, a death row inmate
establishes prejudice if he can show that but for the error he would probably not have been
sentenced to death. Itecause the Texas statute provides that the defendant will be sentenced to
life if the jury cannot agree on an answer to either of the first two special issues, Tex. Grim. Proc.
Code Ann. art. 37.071 § 2(g) (West 1994), it seems reasonable to conclude that a petitioner
satisfies the Sawyerstandard if he can show that a single juror would have refused to answer either
special issue affirmatively. David R. Dow, The 'Third Dimension of Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 22
Am. J. Calm. L. 151, 182 n.50 (1994).
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Johnson was treated much better than was his victim, Ed Thompson,
that person might be right,47
 but that hardly means that Johnson was
treated all that well.
There is little left to say about the morality of capital punishment.
The deterrence data remain indecisive," the arguments flowing from
retribution have not changed in millennia, and there is no question
but that a capital punishment regime will on occasion execute an
innocent man. Different people reach different conclusions from these
facts. Still, three points do, I think, bear emphasis, for they have been
largely obscured in the passion of recent death penalty debate.
The first is that the observation that the State treats the murderer
better than the murderer treated his victim is an observation which,
even if true, is of no ethical moment. Who among us would accept the
moral notion—or even the constitutional notion—that the State's ac-
tion is morally and legally acceptable as long as the degree of pain it
inflicts on the criminal is somewhat below the degree that the criminal
inflicted on his victim? The simple fact is that whether the State ought
to kill is a logically distinct moral question. It is a question that has
nothing to do with the pain inflicted by a particular murderer.
Second, the federal courts in the domain of death penalty appeals
have become an abomination because they have ceased caring about
the law. The courts of appeals hide their shameful opinions by not
publishing them," and the Supreme Court has never announced why
it declines to review cases. Once upon a time Supreme Court Justices
endeavored to separate their political inclinations from their analysis
of Eighth Amendment doctrinal claims. Justice Powell, for example,
often voted for the state in death penalty cases even though he averred
that he would vote against a death penalty were he a member of a state
legislature. Likewise, before he reached the conclusion that the inflic-
tion of the death penalty was unavoidably arbitrary, and therefore
"They also might not be. For instance, polls routinely suggest that most Americans would
not want to know in advance the date and time they will die.
That is, there is no reliable evidence that capital punishment generally deters others from
committing capital crimes. For further discussion of this issue, see MICHAEL L. RADELET &
MA1U VANDIVER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMP:RICA (1988).
"Footnote one of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Johnson's case included this familiar
boilerplate:
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no precedential
value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of
law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published.
Johnson v. Scott, No. 05-20117, unpublished Fifth Circuit opinion, filed 12 September 1995. The
author maintains a copy of the opinion.
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unconstitutional, 5° Justice Blackmun often voted in favor of the state
notwithstanding his personal opposition to the death penalty. 51
Regrettably, the discipline that it takes to reach sound doctrinal
conclusions without having one's analysis distorted by political passion
has evaporated. Judges and Justices routinely express impatience, an-
ger and frustration with lawyers representing condemned inmates. 52
During the oral argument of a recent Texas death penalty case, for
instance, Justice Scalia chastised the petitioner's lawyer for waiting
until five days before the execution before seeking a stay. The lawyer
answered that she had sought the stay the day after the state proceed-
ings concluded—in other words, as soon as she was legally entitled
to. Justice Scalia snapped: "Don't waste any more of your time . I
just want you to know that I'm not happy with the performance of
the Texas Resource Center [the since-defunded organization in Texas
which had responsibility for locating representation for indigent death
row inmates] ."53
When judges themselves, appearing bloodthirsty, start to opine
(much less believe) that the law—that is, the Constitution of the
United States—is defective if it thwarts the intense desires of the states
to execute convicted criminals, then the rule of law has become sub-
ordinate to crass, often base, political impulses. Judges ought not need
be reminded what a Constitution is.
Finally, it bears mention that while the State is many things, one
of those things is a teacher. Though it may be moral for the State at
times to execute, it can never he moral for the State to execute when
its own hands are deeply soiled. Biblical literalists may insist on exact-
ing a life for a life, but surely biblical literalism cannot be deployed to
defend a system which hands out inept lawyers to poor defendants and
then executes those same defendants for their lawyers' failures."
Callins v. Collins, 119 S. Gt. 1127, 1137 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51 Indeed, in the 1976 cases which reinstated the death penalty in America, Justice Blackmun
voted with then Justice Rehnquist in favor of sustaining each of the five challenged statutes.
Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens were the centrists responsible for the result that the manda-
tory death penalty statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana were stricken down whereas the
statutes of Georgia, Texas and Florida survived. See Gregg v, Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (197(i); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v, North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
52 See supra note 4-6 and accompanying text.
"Panel Discussion, supra note 7, at 1111. The case was McFarland v. Scott, 119 S. Ct. 2568,
2574 (1994), which held, with Justice Scalia in dissent, that a capital defendant need not file a
habeas petition in order to invoke his right to qualified representation and to establish a federal
court's jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution.
"Moreover, biblical literalism does not in fitct support the modern state's use of the death
penalty. See Panel Discussion, supra note 7, at 1117-18.
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Most generally of all, citizens learn from the State. If violence on
television and in Hollywood movies desensitizes viewers to the effects
of violence, it is difficult to see how the State's act of executing does
not convey the message to the citizens—the moral message—that kill-
ing is an acceptable ethical solution to one's problems. If we as a society
want to send that message, that is one thing; but it is important that
we acknowledge that that is the message we are sending—and we
should not be surprised when other citizens learn it.
There may be always a time of innocence.
There is never a place. Or if there is no time,
If it is not a thing of time, nor of place,
Existing in the idea of it, alone,
In the sense against calamity, it is not
Less real. For the oldest and coldest philosopher,
There is or may be a time of innocence
As pure principle. Its nature is its end,
That it should be, and yet not be, a thing
That pinches the pity of a pitiful man,
Like a book at evening beautiful but untrue,
Like a book on rising beautiful  and true.
It is like a thing of ether that exists
Almost as predicate. But it exists,
It exists, it is visible, it is, it is.
—Wallace Stevens, The Auroras of Autumn'`'
When the clerk of the Court told me that Johnson's stay applica-
tion had been denied, I called Carl to tell him that we had lost. He
asked how it happened so fast. I explained that the Court did not
actually need the IFP affidavit to decide the case, they just needed
it before they would tell us what they had decided. He asked what
the vote had been and I told him. "So we got two votes," he said.
"That's pretty good. It's a lot better than being shut out." Then he
thanked me.
55
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Ordinarily on the inmate's last day alive he gets to visit with friends
and family until five o'clock.'" Then guards take him from the Ellis I
unit, where death row is, to the institution known locally as the Walls
Unit, where the execution occurs. At four o'clock, prison officials told
Carl's wife that Carl would be taken to the Walls at 4:15 instead of five.
They did not tell her why. She decided not to watch the execution.
Carl wanted to be cremated. His wife Barbara took care of carrying
out his wishes. But first Barbara arranged for a funeral home to recover
the body so that there could be a viewing for his family the day
following the execution. I asked Barbara why she insisted on having a
viewing in a city where she and Carl had no friends or family. She did
not meet or marry Carl until he had been convicted and sentenced to
death. So—because death row inmates have no contact visits—she had
never touched her husband, never kissed him or held his hand. The
reason for the viewing, she told me, was that she wanted the opportu-
nity to feel his skin. "I know I never got to touch him while he was still
alive," she told me, "but, I just wanted to touch him once, just this one
time, even though he's dead."
56 This schedule applied to the old statute, which set executions for after midnight.. Inmates
are now executed between 6 p.m. and midnight, See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
